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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
. Wendell Bosley from the restitution order entered 
guilty to disturbing the 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Kaitlin Timlin and two friends were walking outside in downtown Coeur 
D'Alene after leaving a bar. (R., pp.10-11.) They were approached by a man 
who began to argue with Kaitlin about football. (Id.) The man then exclaimed, "! 
don't need to take shit from a bitch," and struck Timlin in the right side of her 
face, knocking her unconscious. (Id.) One of Timlin's friends then struck the 
man and knocked him to the ground. (Id.) Timlin suffered a subcranial brain 
aneurysm and was hospitalized. (R., p.1 O; Tr., 1 p.23, Ls.14-20.) 
Responding officers located and identified Bosley at the scene standing 
approximately 10 feet from Timlin. (R., pp.12-13.) They observed him to have 
numerous abrasions on his forehead. (Id.) Bosley told the officer that he had 
been arguing with Timlin about football when one of Timlin's friends stuck him 
without provocation. (Id.) Bosley also told the officers that he was "not going to 
go down for hitting a girl." (Id.) 
The state charged Bosley with aggravated battery. (R., pp.37-38.) 
However, prior to trial, Bosley agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of 
1 In its Respondent's brief, the state cites only to the transcript that contains the 
change of plea, sentencing, restitution hearings. The state refers to this 
transcript as "Tr." 
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disturbing the peace.2 (R., pp.100-102.) A written plea agreement indicated that 
ag to "pay restitution." (R., p.102.) the change hearing, 
Bosley indicated that he "agreed to be responsible for restitution that will be 
determined on a later date at a hearing." (Tr., p.7, Ls.13-17.) The district court 
imposed 180 days jail with 170 suspended, with 40 hours in the Sherriff s 
Community Labor Program in lieu of 10 days jail. (R., p.113.) 
The state requested the district court to order Bosley to pay restitution in 
the amounts of $400 to the Idaho Industrial Commission for payments made to 
Timlin to compensate for lost wages due to missed work; and $2,730 to Timlin 
herself, for non-refundable tuition payments made for classes she was unable to 
attend. (R., pp.108-109, 111, 118.) Bosley filed a written objection and 
requested a hearing with regard to the proposed $2,730 restitution for Timlin. 
(R., p.114.) 
At the hearing, Timlin testified and the state presented evidence 
supporting the $2,730 restitution request. (Tr., p.23, L.7 - p.33, L.19.) Bosley 
argued that the court should not order restitution because there was no causal 
nexus between the punch that knocked Timlin unconscious and the crime Bosley 
actually pied guilty to - disturbing the peace. (Tr., p.35, L.8 - p.36, L.25.) Bosley 
also argued that even if there was such a nexus, restitution for Timlin's. non-
refundable tuition payments was not appropriate because it was an expense that 
2 The amended information alleged that Bosley disturbed Timlin's peace by 
"tumultuous conduct, offensive conduct, threatening, quarreling, fighting and/or 
challenging to a fight." (R., p.100) At the change of plea hearing, Bosley did not 
admit or deny striking Timlin. (See Tr., p.5, L.4 - p.13, L.15.) 
2 
Timlin was going to incur regardless of whether she had been injured. (Tr., p.37, 
Ls.1-17.) 
The court concluded that pursuant to the plea agreement, Bosley agreed 
to pay Timlin restitution for injuries suffered as a result of the attack. (Tr., p.39, 
L.6 - p.40, L.21.) The court also found that Timlin's non-refundable tuition 
payments constituted an economic loss resulting from the attack. (Tr., p.40, L.24 
- p.42, L.17.) The court then imposed a restitution order in the amounts 
requested by the state. (R., pp.126-127.) Bosley timely appealed. (R., pp.128-
131.) 
3 
ISSUE 
states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the Court err in finding the defendant had agreed to 
restitution for uncharged conduct? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as: 
Has Bosley failed to show that the district court erred in concluding that he 
had agreed to pay restitution to Kaitlin Timlin for economic losses caused by the 
conduct for which he was originally charged? 
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ARGUMENT 
Bosley Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Concluding That He 
Agreed To Pay Restitution To Kaitlin Timlin For Economic Losses Caused By 
The Conduct For VVhich He Was Originally Charged 
I ntrod u ctio n 
agreed, pursuant to 
the district court erred in 
agreement, to pay restitution to 
that 
Timlin 
economic losses caused by the attack for which Bosley was originally charged. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-9.) Bosley's claim fails because a review of the 
plea agreement and the transcript of Bosley's change plea hearing reveal 
existence of his unambiguous agreement to pay restitution. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and legal effect of a clear and unambiguous plea 
agreement, and determinations of whether plea agreements are ambiguous, are 
matters of law subject to free review on appeal. State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911, 
914, 120 P.3d 299, 302 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Allen, 143 Idaho 267, 272, 141 
P.3d 1136, 1141 (Ct. App. 2006). 
C. The Terms Of Bosley's Plea Agreement Required Him To Pay Restitution 
To Kaitlin Timlin For Economic Losses Resulting From The Attack 
Plea agreements are contractual in nature and generally are examined by 
courts in accordance with contract law standards. State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 
73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005). "As with other contracts, provisions of plea 
agreements are occasionally ambiguous; the government 'ordinarily must bear 
responsibility for any lack of clarity."' State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 596, 226 
5 
3d 535, 538 (2010) (quoting United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1338 
(9th Cir.1993)). 
In this case, both the text of the written plea agreement and statements 
made by Bosley and his counsel during the change of plea hearing show that 
Bosley unambiguously agreed to pay restitution to Kaitlin Timlin, and that a 
subsequent restitution hearing would determine the amount of such restitution, 
and whether any requested restitution constituted economic loss that resulted 
from the attack. 
The state extended a written "pretrial settlement offer," which Bosley 
accepted and signed. (R., p.102.) The written agreement contained a list of 
stock terms with corresponding check-boxes. (Id.) The corresponding check-
box for the term, "Pay restitution," was marked. (Id.) Initially, the written 
agreement identified specific amounts to be paid to the Idaho Industrial 
Commission's Crime Victim Fund, and to Katilin Timlin, but these entries were 
crossed out and replaced by a notation stating, "subject to hearing." (Id.) 
At the change of plea hearing, Bosley's defense attorney described the 
plea agreement to the district court, stating, "we have also agreed to have a 
restitution hearing at a later date on - to determine the amount of restitution." 
(Tr., p.5, Ls.22-24.) The district court asked Bosley, "you've agreed to be 
responsible for restitution that will be determined on a later date at a hearing; is 
that correct?" (Tr., p.7, Ls.13-16.) Bosley responded in the affirmative. (Tr., p.7, 
L.17.) 
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Bosley therefore plainly agreed to pay restitution in this case, subject to 
determinations regarding the appropriate amount, and implicitly, whether 
requested restitution constituted economic loss actually caused by the attack. 
There is no ambiguity as to which victim or incident was the subject of the 
restitution agreement. There was only one victim named in the amended 
charging information, Kaitlin Timlin. (R., p.100.) There was only one act which 
resulted in the injuries for which restitution was sought - Bosley's punch to 
Tirnlin's head. (See R., pp.37-38; Tr., p.23, Ls.14-24.) Therefore, by agreeing to 
pay restitution, Bosley necessarily agreed to pay restitution for economic losses 
that resulted from this punch. 
On appeal, Bosley also contends that the district court incorrectly 
construed the plea agreement as requiring him to pay restitution for any manner 
of alleged economic loss set forth by the state, and that the court precluded him 
from objecting to any restitution request on the ground that it was unrelated to the 
attack. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-9.) Bosley's contention is incorrect because he 
fails to recognize the separate and distinct conclusions made by the district court 
after the restitution hearing. First, the court found that Bosley did, in fact, agree 
to pay restitution for Timlin's economic losses resulting from the punch that 
knocked her unconscious. (Tr., p.39, L.6 - p.40, L.21.) However, Timlin was 
still permitted to argue that Timlin's non-refundable tuition payments were not 
caused by that punch, but were instead an expense that Timlin was going to 
incur regardless of any injury. (Tr., p.37, Ls.1-17.) In fact, rather than preclude 
Bosley from objecting to restitution for the tuition payments on this ground, the 
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court stated the opposite, that Bosley had "the right to question [restitution for 
tuition payments] because we had agreed to set a hearing up." (Tr., p.40, 
p.41, L.3.) The court went on to reject Bosley's argument, and found that the 
tuition payments did constitute economic loss resulting from Bosley's conduct. 
(Tr., p.41, L.4- p.42, L.17.) Bosley has not challenged this finding on appeal. 3 
Bosley also appears to contend that any agreement he made to "pay 
restitution" pertained only to his subsequent stipulation to pay $400 to the crime 
victims fund for payments it made to Timlin for lost wages that resulted from the 
attack. (Appellant's brief, p.8.) Bosley, however, has not attempted to explain 
the basis of any distinction, in terms of the plea agreement, between this $400 
restitution award, and the proposed $2,730 restitution which was requested for 
Timlin's non-refundable tuition payments. Both proposed restitution awards were 
intended to compensate Timlin for economic losses suffered as a result of the 
attack. 
In fact, rather than support his position, Bosley's stipulation to pay $400 to 
the crime victims' fund supports the position of the state. Bosley agreed to pay 
$400 to compensate Timlin for economic loss suffered as a result of the attack. 
3 While Bosley has not challenged the district court's determination that Timlin's 
non-refundable tuition payments constituted economic loss resulting from 
Bosley's attack, the state asserts that the court's determination was correct. For 
the purposes of criminal restitution, "Economic loss" includes, but is not limited 
to, "the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost 
wages, and direct out-of-pocket losses or. expenses." I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a). At 
the restitution hearing, Timlin testified that as a result of the injuries she suffered 
from the attack, she was unable to attend classes. for which she had paid non-
refundable tuition. (Tr., p.23, L.10 - p.27, L.8.) As the district court properly 
reasoned, Timlin's situation was analogous to one in which an individual 
purchased a car which was subsequently destroyed by a criminal act. (Tr., p.41, 
L.4 - p.42, L.5.) 
8 
(Tr., p.21, L.23 - p.22, L.2.) At the restitution hearing, however, contrary to the 
inherent concession in his stipulation, Bosley argued that the proposed $2,730 
restitution payment was inappropriate because there was no proximate cause 
between the attack and the crime he actually pied guilty to, disturbing the peace. 
(Tr., p.35, L.8 - p.36, L.25.) If Bosiey's plea agreement bound him to pay $400 
to the crime victims fund despite the nature of the crime he actually pied guilty to, 
as Bosley appears to concede, it also bound him to pay $2,730 to Timlin for non-
refundable tuition payments, if those payments also constituted economic losses 
caused by the attack. As noted above, Bosley had the opportunity to argue that 
these payments did not constitute economic losses caused by the attack, but the 
court rejected his argument, and Bosley has not challenged this determination on 
appeal. 
Bosley agreed, pursuant to his plea agreement, to pay restitution to Kaitlin 
Timlin for economic losses caused by the attack for which Bosley was originally 
charged. Bosley has therefore failed to show that the district court erred by 
holding him to this agreement, and by ordering him to pay restitution as 
requested by the state. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
restitution 
DATED this 11th day of December, 2013. 
MARK W. OLSoiJ' 
Deputy Attorney General 
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